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Abstract 
Since the sweeping (re)introduction of multiparty systems in the early 1990s almost all 
sub-Saharan countries have introduced bans on ethnic or – in more general terms – par-
ticularistic parties. Such party bans have been neglected in research, and this paper en-
gages in a preliminary analysis of their effects on democracy and peace. Theoretically, par-
ticularistic party bans can block particularisms from entering politics but also run the risk 
of forcing groups to resort to extra-legal or violent means. Neutral or context-dependent 
effects are also possible. Applying macro-qualitative comparison and bivariate statistics on 
the basis of a unique inventory of party bans and readily available indicators for the de-
pendent variables, no simple connection can be detected. Rather, context conditions seem 
to be of superior explanatory power. We also find a systematic connection between party 
bans and variables that could be conceptualized as the causes of their implementation. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Stärkung von Frieden und Demokratie durch Parteienregulierung?  
Ethnische Parteienverbote in Afrika 
Seit der flächendeckenden (Wieder-)Einführung von Mehrparteiensystemen zu Anfang 
der 1990er Jahre haben fast alle subsaharischen Länder ethnische oder – allgemeiner – par-
tikularistische Parteien verboten. Diese Verbote wurden bislang kaum untersucht und der 
vorliegende Artikel unternimmt eine vorläufige Analyse ihrer Auswirkungen auf Demo-
kratie und Frieden. Theoretisch betrachtet können durch solche Verbote ethnische oder 
andere Partikularismen aus dem politischen System herausgehalten werden, sie könnten 
entsprechende Gruppen aber möglicherweise auch zum Rückgriff auf nicht verfassungs-
mäßige oder gewaltsame Mittel zwingen. Neutrale oder kontextabhängige Auswirkungen 
sind ebenfalls denkbar. Unter Anwendung makroqualitativer Vergleiche und bivariater 
Statistiken auf Basis einer einzigartigen Datenbasis zu Parteienverboten in Afrika und ver-
fügbaren Indikatoren für die abhängigen Variablen können jedoch keine einfachen Aus-
wirkungen von Parteienverboten entdeckt werden. Kontextbedingungen scheinen von 
höherer Erklärungskraft. Zwar sind systematische Zusammenhänge mit Variablen er-
kennbar, diese können aber eher als Ursachen von Parteienverboten angesehen werden. 
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1 Introduction 
Since the end of the Cold War the number of sub-Saharan countries which have held multi-
party elections has increased dramatically. In mid-2007 we could find only a few countries – 
examples include Eritrea, Swaziland, and Somalia – which had not held such elections. 
However, the (re) introduction of multiparty politics in the early 1990s was accompanied by 
fears that party politics would encourage the politicization of ethnicity and other socially at-
tributed identities such as regional provenience and religion, resulting in intercommunal 
conflict and political instability. For this reason, the overwhelming majority of sub-Saharan 
countries have introduced legal provisions to ban such ‘particularistic’ parties. 
6 Becher/Basedau: Promoting Peace and Democracy through Party Regulation? 
Surprisingly, ethnic and other particularistic party bans have received little scholarly atten-
tion. The academic debate on Africa and other world regions has focused on other measures 
of party regulation and institutional engineering – electoral systems, party funding, federal-
ism, and decentralisation – which are designed to accommodate intercommunal relations 
and contribute to the survival and consolidation of democracy. 
To date there has been virtually no research on party bans in Africa, let alone their effects. 
The project ‘Managing Ethnic Conflict through Institutional Engineering. Ethnic Party Bans 
in Africa’, funded by the Fritz-Thyssen-Stiftung, seeks to fill this gap through a study that 
addresses several relevant research questions, including the origins of party bans, their 
normative compatibility with democracy, and their actual impact.1 This paper deals with 
what is possibly the most important aspect in terms of institutional engineering and em-
barks on a preliminary inquiry into the effects of implemented party bans in sub-Saharan 
Africa. The central research problem is thus as follows: Is there any evidence that the implemen-
tation of ethnic and other particularistic party bans has an impact on conflict and democracy? 
The paper proceeds as follows. The first section clarifies the concept of an ethnic ban, fa-
vouring the more abstract term ‘particularistic party ban’. This is followed by a brief theo-
retical discussion about how particularistic party bans may affect levels and dynamics of 
democracy and intercommunal conflict. Based on this discussion, we develop a number of 
hypotheses. After presenting the database and outlining the methodology, the main section 
engages in a preliminary test of these hypotheses on the effects and discusses the results. 
The final section draws a number of conclusions in terms of theoretical and methodological 
as well as practical aspects and highlights areas for future research. 
2 Theoretical Framework: Potential Impact of Party Bans on Conflict and Democracy 
2.1 Concept and Types of Ethnic and Particularistic Party Bans 
Even a preliminary study of the impact of ethnic party bans requires a clear cut notion of the 
object under investigation. What do we understand by ethnic or particularistic party bans? 
According to our understanding (see also Basedau/Bogaards/Hartmann/Niesen 2007; Becher 
2008; Bogaards 2007: 179) an ethnic or particularistic party ban denotes a highly restrictive 
official legal sanction that aims at prohibiting the existence or activity of a political party 
which is composed of, seeks the support of, and acts on behalf or in the interest of a particu-
lar ethnic or particularistic identity group. In a broad sense (Jackson 1984), ethnicity em-
braces all kinds of socially attributed identities such as clan, community, ethnicity, faith (re-
ligion), gender, language, regional provenance, race, sect or tribe, and the like, all of which 
                                                     
1  The project: ‘Managing Ethnic Conflict through Institutional Engineering. Ethnic Party Bans in Africa’ is be-
ing conducted in close cooperation with the Jacobs University Bremen and the Universities of Darmstadt and 
Duisburg-Essen. Anika Becher is the main researcher, Matthias Basedau is the supervisor of the ‘Hamburg 
chapter’ of the project. 
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are the result of self-ascription or ascription by others but are usually inherited by birth and 
cannot easily be changed by an act of individual will. In order to avoid confusion with the 
narrower definition, which closely resembles ‘tribe’, we have decided to use only the generic 
term ‘particularistic’ for the aforementioned groups (cf. Almond and Coleman 1960; Bo-
gaards 2007: 179) and related political parties, in the sense developed above. 
Using the more abstract term ‘particularistic party’ does not mean, however, that we do not 
want to differentiate between the respective social bases of a possible ban. At this stage and 
in light of what can be found in Africa in terms of implemented bans2 it seems reasonable to 
distinguish parties on the basis of 1) ethnicity or tribe, 2) religion, 3) race, and 4) region un-
der the umbrella of particularistic parties.3 
Moreover, these bans can take different forms with regard to the respective legal dimension 
of the ban. Provisions can differ in terms of whether or not they ‘negatively’ prohibit such 
particularistic parties or ‘positively’ proscribe specific requirements which are designed to 
ensure parties’ non-particularistic nature. A ‘positive’ ban in this sense would be a require-
ment that a party is nationally represented in terms of party membership at the leader and/or 
the supporters’ level. Ghana and Sierra Leone, for instance, proscribe that all parties have to 
maintain party branches and offices throughout the country (see Bogaards 2007: 182). 
The characteristics of particularistic party bans are not confined to the nature of particular-
ism and the differentiation between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ bans. Another pertinent differ-
entiation refers to the nature of the legal sanction. The term ‘ban’ may include 1) the banning 
and dissolution of an already existing party; 2) a temporary ban, that is, suspension; or 3) the 
denial of registration to a group that wants to transform into a political party. 
Moreover, it makes a difference whether the party bans are just a ‘legal option’ or whether a 
ban is actually executed or implemented. Each may have different effects (see discussion be-
low). Given the limited number of countries without legal possibilities and the likely more 
measurable impact of actual implementation, we have decided to focus on the implementa-
tion of particularistic party bans. 
Although this paper concentrates on implemented bans and only stresses the differences re-
garding the social basis and legal nature of particularistic bans, a typology of party bans 
may refer to numerous other features (see Basedau/Bogaards/Hartmann/Niesen 2007; Bo-
gaards 2007b; Becher 2008) such as legal source (constitution, party, or electoral code) and 
responsible institution (courts, registrar of parties, ministry of home affairs, electoral com-
mission, etc.) or – beyond the differentiation between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ measures – 
                                                     
2  We limit the meaning of ‘implementation’ to any event in which a (would-be) political party is actually le-
gally sanctioned with suspension, dissolution or denied registration. ‘Enforcement’ of party bans means that 
the provisions are observed. This may include an implemented party ban but not necessarily so, for instance, 
when no such (would-be) party emerges. 
3  In order to capture the behavioural dimension of the ban (‘acts on behalf of or in the interest of’), we assign 
respective party bans on, for instance, ‘tribalism’ to ethnic parties, ‘racism’ to racial parties, and ‘regionalism’ 
to regional parties. 
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the regulated dimension of party politics (name, symbol, organization, membership, pro-
gramme, campaigns, etc.) as well as the degree of ‘restrictiveness’: In a given setting parties 
may be easier to ban and opportunities and actual bans might extend to a larger number of 
identities and groups (see Table 1). 
Table 1: Relevant Characteristics of Particularistic Party Bans 
 Social Basis Legal Form of  
Sanction 
Dimension of 
Party Politics 
Legal Source Responsible Institution
Examples Ethnic 
Regional 
Religious 
Race 
Dissolution 
Suspension 
Denial of registration
Name 
Symbol 
Programme 
Campaign 
Membership 
Constitution 
Electoral code
Party code 
Courts 
Ministries 
Electoral commission 
Registrar of parties 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
2.2 How Particularistic Party Bans May Affect Conflict and Democracy 
Given the culturally heterogeneous structure and the history of intercommunal conflict in 
many African countries (and elsewhere), the political, and particularly the partisan, organi-
zation of ethnic and other particularistic identities can be seen as generally undesirable (cf. 
Horowitz 1985; 1991; Salih 2003; McMahon 2004). According to Bogaards (2007b: 5), the poli-
ticization of ethnicity in Africa has been associated with ethnic conflict and ethnic violence; 
human rights violations; repression – even genocide; political instability; democratic erosion; 
and the establishment of non-democratic regimes. But how does the politicization of ethnic 
and other particularistic identities produce such results? Basically, there are at least four 
transmission channels (Bogaards 2007b: 5-6): 
First, in the case of an ethnic or cultural majority, (party) politics along cultural lines may 
lead to the marginalisation and exclusion of a cultural minority. As a consequence and sec-
ond, such minorities may feel encouraged to resort to undemocratic or even violent means 
in order to counter this dominance. Third, irrespective of the relative size of particular iden-
tity groups, ethnic and other identity-based politics are likely to raise the stakes of the game, 
fanning emotions and reinforcing in- and out-group identities, thus increasing the likelihood 
of disturbances of public order. When religious divisions involve conflict over values – 
which can hardly be subject to compromise given their divine origin – the politicization of 
particularistic identities is particularly risky. Fourth, particularistic parties will probably en-
trench such societal divisions, keeping people apart instead of bringing them together. In 
sum, the politicization of particularistic identities makes intercommunal conflict and, as a 
result or independently, undemocratic politics more likely. 
What can party bans do about these risks? From a functionalist perspective, the party system 
is the central intermediate structure between society and government (Sartori 1976: ix). In 
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this sense, the party system should articulate and aggregate societal interests, transforming 
them into political programmes and, once a particular party has been successful at the ballot 
box, government policies (cf. Basedau 2007: 108-112). Prohibitions of particularistic parties, if 
effective, have the potential to block particularistic politics from entering party politics or to 
remove it from the party system (cf. Bogaards 2007: 176-180). Once accepted or effectively 
demonstrated, such bans may have an additional pre-emptive effect. Political parties then 
have to organize along other lines, seeking support from several identity groups and using 
other cleavages (class or ideas and values) as the basic source of partisan support. 
However, one may also argue – from the same functionalist perspective – that particularistic 
party bans have an adverse impact on intercommunal relations and democracy. Since party 
bans block certain societal interests from articulation and expression in the political system, 
particularistic groups may feel marginalised and seek other, extra-legal and sometimes even 
violent means of expression. Bans may reduce the legitimacy of the system and hence be-
come subject to conflict themselves.4 In the worst of cases, particularistic party bans form 
part of the ‘menu of manipulation’ (Schedler 2002) and are abused to suppress the opposi-
tion, and the idealist motive of ‘bringing people together’ may be nothing but a pretext.5 It 
may be more conducive to democracy and peace that the law does not block particularistic 
politics but seeks to aggregate or transform it (see Bogaards 2007: 180-187). 
It is also possible that party bans, either implemented or only legally possible, have very lit-
tle or no impact on democracy and peace. One can think of at least two reasons for this: 
First, there is little doubt that both democracy and conflict have numerous and interrelated 
determinants. Classical risk factors for democracy and peace in Africa include abject pov-
erty, prior conflict, dysfunctional formal and informal institutions, and the lack of wise and 
responsible leadership, not to mention specific path dependent and contingent historical de-
velopments. In such a setting party bans might have no noteworthy influence. Second, even 
if the regulations are regularly and rigidly enforced and/or implemented – which cannot be 
taken for granted, in some cases due to poor regulatory capacity – particularistic parties may 
find ‘loopholes’ to escape legal sanctions. Requirements to fill leadership positions with 
members of different groups can be easily bypassed by finding ‘alibi’ members. Particularis-
tic interests may organize as political associations and exert legal and non-violent influence.6 
Taking the intermediate position of the party system discussed above into account, the com-
plete absence of effects of party bans does not seem very likely. Party bans, like other party 
regulation and general institutional measures, have the potential to transform society and 
                                                     
4  At this point it becomes clear that normative aspects cannot be completely separated from functionalist or 
empirical aspects. For a discussion on the normative aspects see Basedau/Bogaards/Hartmann/Niesen 2007. 
5  It could be argued that many of the one-party regimes in post-colonial Africa usually legitimised themselves – 
at least partly – by stating the need to combat ethnicity and/or through the politicization of cultural diversity. 
6  With no noteworthy impact, the existence of party bans may simply be a result of past problems or, if abu-
sively implemented, an expression of authoritarianism rather than an effective tool of institutional engineering. 
However, this question should be addressed by a study of the causes of party bans (see Bogaards 2007b: 3). 
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government or governance. Rather, the magnitude (or relative weight) and direction of ef-
fects of party bans vis-à-vis democracy and peace will depend on surrounding or context 
conditions: 
First, the political relevance of the party to be banned or group to be barred from becoming 
a party is of utmost importance. A ban on a major opposition group certainly differs from a 
similar legal action targeted at a small and marginal group or party. Second and possibly re-
lated, effects may depend on the ‘particularistic landscape’ of the country. In the case of cul-
tural majorities, the ban of particularistic parties representing cultural minorities may be 
problematic for democracy. In terms of conflict, it might be risky to ban a party which repre-
sents one of the major particularistic (and politicized) groups. Similar to what Horowitz 
(1985) has argued regarding the likelihood of ethnic conflict, a ban on just one particularistic 
party in a highly fragmented setting may have no negative impact. Third, the adverse effects 
of a ban on conflict and democracy are more likely when the political system has found 
other, successful ways to deal with diversity: If the ban thwarts other, more permissive regu-
lations, it may be less accepted and is thus more likely to have negative consequences. In 
fact, it has to be understood that party bans are only one tool in a large box of possible 
methods for party regulation and institutional engineering, including proportional and 
compensatory electoral systems (Sisk/Reynolds 1998; Reynolds 1999; Reilly/Reynolds 1999; 
Bogaards 2004), federalism (De Villier 1997; Osaghae 1999; Levy/Tapscott 2001) and decen-
tralisation (Mehler 2001). Fourth, the type of party ban may matter. For instance, one could 
argue that positive measures, particularly regional distribution requirements, do not neces-
sarily block particularistic interests but are rather an effective incentive to aggregate them 
(Bogaards 2007: 181-182). Moreover, the fact that dissolutions and suspensions of already ex-
isting and established parties will trigger more problems than the denial of registration can-
not be excluded; in this respect the social basis of the (would-be) party concerned may also 
matter. Fifth, the nature of the regime and the party system might count. Positive effects are 
more probable when bans are executed in a democratic setting and a non-dominant party 
system because marginalisation and legitimacy problems are less likely. Finally, the constel-
lation of the general surrounding conditions probably largely affects the magnitude of 
party-ban effects. Similar to the effects of institutions on democracy discussed by Dahl 
(1996), party bans may be rather irrelevant if conditions such as socio-economic develop-
ment, the general record of intercommunal relations, leadership features, control over forces 
of coercion, and external influences jointly point in a positive or negative direction. In less 
clear-cut constellations the party bans may matter. 
Certainly, these considerations are far from being exhaustive. One conclusion, however, 
seems to be safe at this stage. How, to what extent, and in what direction party bans affect 
peace and democracy is far from being clear-cut. One can think of a multitude of diverging, 
sometimes contradictory hypotheses which are summarized in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Hypotheses on the Impact of Implemented Particularistic Party Bans (IPPB) 
Affected Area Direction  
of Impact 
Peace and Political Stability Democracy 
H 1.1 IPP bans decrease the politicization of ethnicity 
and other particularistic identities. As a result, inter-
communal and other violence is less likely. Hence, in-
directly, party bans contribute to political stability and 
peace. 
H 2.1 IPP bans help to create a moderate (behavioural) 
polarization in the party system because particularistic 
parties tend to aggravate relations between parties. 
Hence, indirectly, party bans contribute to the func-
tioning of democracy. 
Positive 
H 1.2 IPP bans indirectly contribute to peace due to 
their positive effect on democracy. 
H 2.2 IPP bans indirectly contribute to democracy due 
to their pacifying effect on interethnic and other inter-
communal relations. 
H 1.3 IPP bans have a negative impact on interethnic 
conflicts because they exclude relevant political actors 
from the political scene and thus reduce the regime’s 
legitimacy and/or force particularistic actors to resort 
to violent means. Party bans themselves may become 
an object of conflict. 
H 2.3 IPP bans have an adverse effect on democracy 
because the bans are abused (or used as pretexts) to 
suppress the opposition and violate freedom rights. 
Negative 
 H 2.4 IPP bans have an indirect adverse effect on de-
mocracy because party bans force particularistic 
groups to express their interests with extra-legal and 
often violent means (H 1.3), which is detrimental to 
democracy. 
H 1.4 IPP bans have no effect on conflict but are an ex-
pression of past problems. 
H 2.5 IPP bans have no effect on democratization but 
are an expression of authoritarianism. 
H 1.5 IPP bans are not systematically connected to con-
flict. Other pertinent variables, particularly risk factors 
(level of socio-economic development, government ef-
fectiveness, prior conflict, etc.), are superior in explain-
ing the levels of conflict 
H 2.6 IPP bans are not systematically connected to de-
mocracy. Other pertinent variables (level of socio-
economic development, government effectiveness, con-
flict, etc.) are superior in explaining the levels of de-
mocracy. 
Neutral 
H 1.6 Ethnic party bans have no impact on interethnic 
conflicts because the main actors in conflicts are not 
political parties but other ethnic political groupings not 
affected by the party ban OR because, despite bans, 
particularistic parties find loopholes to continue to op-
erate. 
 
H 1.7 There are several types of effects of IPP bans. 
Some cases follow the pro-peace and others the anti-
peace logic. 
H 2.7 There are several types of effects of IPP bans. 
Some cases follow the pro-democracy and others the 
anti-democracy logic. 
Context  
Dependent 
H 1.8 Negative, neutral or positive effects of IPP bans 
on conflict depend on the context. Positive effects are 
more likely when the following conditions exist: 
-  Little political relevance of targeted party or group 
-  No cultural majorities 
-  Low levels of ethnic/particularistic politicization 
-  No undemocratic regimes 
-  Non-dominant party systems 
-  More-proportional electoral systems 
-  Rather positive general surrounding conditions 
-  Ban is exercised through denial of registration 
H 2.8 Negative, neutral or positive effects of IPP bans 
on conflict depend on the context. Positive effects are 
more likely when the following conditions exist: 
-  Little political relevance of targeted party or group 
-  No cultural majorities 
-  Low levels of ethnic/particularistic politicization 
-  No undemocratic regimes 
-  Non-dominant party systems 
-  More-proportional electoral systems 
-  Rather positive general surrounding conditions 
-  Ban is exercised through denial of registration 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
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3 Particularistic Party Bans in Africa: A Preliminary Analysis 
3.1 Database and Methodology 
3.1.1 Empirical Strategy and Samples 
Given the large number of hypotheses – and the many contextual conditions involved – we 
have to admit that not all hypotheses can be fully tested at this preliminary stage. Given that 
the project on ‘ethnic party bans’ is still a work in progress, there were a number of reasons 
not to employ more sophisticated quantitative and qualitative methods such as QCA or 
multivariate regressions. The compilation of our database has thus far resulted only in a 
fairly limited number of available cases, and some of the variables were on a nominal scale 
only (see below and Annex I). 
Hence, a multivariate quantitative approach, in particular, does not seem suitable at this 
stage. Instead, we have embarked on a possibly less sophisticated comparative approach, 
which, however, has the advantage of keeping individual cases identifiable and will serve as 
a starting point for further testing. 
Generally, a two-step approach was applied (see Table 3). As a first step we looked at the 
population of all implemented party bans (N = 22) between 1990 and 2006 (‘Sample I’). Cases 
were coded as country years; any implementation of one (or more) particularistic party ban(s) 
is a case (e.g., Rwanda 2003, Nigeria 1999). Thus, if in one particular year more than one party 
was banned, it was nevertheless counted as one case.7 We did not use formal cross-table statis-
tics (that is Chi-Square Statistics) because the number of cases here is too low. In order to find 
out whether these cases are systematically connected to our dependent and intervening vari-
ables, we used simple macro-qualitative comparison in cross tables. For instance, if particular-
istic party bans positively affect the dynamics of peace and democracy, we must expect that in 
most of the cases we can find improvements in the two areas after the ban. 
Table 3: Samples and Methods 
 Sample I Sample II 
Population All party bans 1990-2006 in  
country-years (e.g. Rwanda 2003) 
All sub-Saharan countries with the  
legal possibility of party bans 
Number of cases 22 41 
Main method for  
detecting significant  
relationships 
Cross-table macro-qualitative  
comparison 
Cross-table macro-qualitative comparison
Bivariate statistics (correlation  
coefficients according to scale type) 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
                                                     
7  This could be questioned, since there might be many differences with regard to several bans in one particular 
year and country. However, in almost all cases with various bans in one year, the official reason was identi-
cal. The only exception is Mauritania, which had a ban due to race and a denial of registration due to ethnic-
ity in 2002 and, thus, is counted twice. 
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In order to control for the differences with countries where no party bans were imple-
mented, we had to apply a different sampling logic. We used a second sample (‘Sample II’) 
of all sub-Saharan countries which have the legal possibility to ban particularistic parties,8 
dichotomizing the independent variable in terms of whether or not one or more party bans 
were implemented. The exercise resulted in a sample of 41 countries. Similarly to what we 
did in the first step, we used simple macro-comparative cross tabs in this case, but the vari-
ance in the independent variable and the higher number of cases also allowed us to apply a 
bivariate analysis. If bans are effective, we expect ‘ban countries’ to perform better in dy-
namics of peace and democracy than ‘non-ban countries’. Bivariate statistics should show a 
positive correlation between positive dynamics of peace/democracy and the implementation 
of bans. Controlling surrounding conditions allows for the testing of other possible determi-
nants of peace and democracy. 
3.1.2 Database and Sources 
Even a preliminary study of the effects of party bans requires a fairly voluminous set of in-
dicators. Though certainly far from being complete in terms of what can be conceptualized 
as theoretically important, the following paragraphs present an overview of the variables we 
have collected thus far. A detailed description of the data – particularly the scale levels, op-
erationalizations, and sources – is available in Annex I. 
The main problem in empirical research on the effects of party bans in Africa is certainly the 
almost complete lack of systematic descriptive data on the prevalence of and the exact na-
ture of legal provisions and the actual implementation of party bans. Thus, one of the main 
tasks of the project has been the collection of systematic information on respective legal 
sources and actual events, resulting in a unique inventory on particularistic party bans. Data 
collection included a systematic assessment of all constitutions, party codes, and electoral 
laws which were in effect in sub-Saharan Africa between 1990 and late 2006. This resulted in 
an almost complete collection and examination of such sources (less than 5% missing). 
However, the legal possibility of particularistic party bans served exclusively as a filter for 
the population of our second sample (see above). According to our research question, the in-
dependent variable is the actual implementation of party bans. Raising data for this variable 
proved difficult. In particular, it is a serious challenge to verify that a party ban was not im-
plemented. In order to capture all such cases, we systematically examined pertinent sources 
such as various editions of the German language Afrika-Jahrbuch (1990-2003) and its English 
language successor the Africa Yearbook (2004-2005), Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) coun-
try reports, Freedom House country reports, U.S. Department of State human rights country 
reports, and International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) country 
                                                     
8  We also included Kenya and Zambia, where particularistic parties were denied registration even if there ap-
parently was no explicit legal possibility to do so (Zambia only introduced the possibility in 2006). 
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reports. In addition, we conducted an expert survey of some 100 experts on the 48 countries 
in sub-Saharan Africa – from which approximately two thirds responded. As a result of this 
investigation we found out that particularistic party bans are more frequently implemented 
than originally assumed. Out of 41 countries which have the legal possibility of banning (par-
ticularistic) parties, 11 countries implemented altogether 71 of those bans. 
Moreover, we did not limit the data collection to counting the number of countries and tar-
geted parties; we also identified the official legal reasons and the precise form of legal ac-
tion. Altogether there were seven outright bans and two suspensions. In 62 cases would-be 
parties were denied registration. In 54 cases the reason was ‘region’, in 9 cases ‘ethnicity’, in 
7 cases ‘religion’, and in one case ‘race’. 
In contrast to the case of the independent variable, for the dependent variable we could draw 
on already available data from sources usually employed in empirical studies. For conflict we 
used several sources and distinguished between the levels of conflict using two thresholds 
(‘minor/latent’ vs. ‘major’): For major conflict (Conflict I) the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme 
(UCDP) data, with a 25-battle-death threshold per annum, as well as the database of the Ar-
beitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung (AKUF) were used. In order to capture minor con-
flicts we consulted the Konfliktbarometer of the Heidelberger Institut für Internationale Konfliktfor-
schung (HIIK), which also takes into account minor or latent conflict below the UCDP thresh-
old. This resulted in a second dummy variable which includes minor and major conflicts 
(Conflict II). For democracy we relied on Freedom House (FH), although both dimensions of 
the FH ratings – political rights and civil liberties – were taken into account. 
For both conflict and democracy variables we tried to capture the dynamic dimension of 
both phenomena by using not only information on absolute levels – for instance, in 1990 and 
2007 – but also data from before and after the implementation of party bans, usually one 
year before and one year after. 
In order to be able to control important context conditions, we also compiled data on four 
clusters of such conditions, more than 45 variables altogether. In almost all cases we drew on 
data from readily available sources (for details see Annex I) and tried to capture different 
points of time and dynamics. These clusters include the following (see also Table 4): 
- Data on the ‘particularistic landscape’ of the countries in question including the share of 
different religious groups (see Basedau/De Juan/Körner 2007), several measures for eth-
nic fractionalization and politicization (see Posner 2004), and pertinent information from 
the Minorities at Risk project such as the number of minorities and the existence of a mi-
nority problem. 
- (Other) information on the context of conflict, such as the type of conflict, in terms of 
possible cause of conflict, time span and prior conflict. 
- Indicators of other phenomena seen as classical economic and political ‘risk factors’ such 
as dependence on primary commodities, level of income and human development, and 
regime stability before 1990. 
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- Data on political institutions, namely the electoral system, the party system, and the 
form of government. In this case we used sources such as Basedau (2007) and Hartmann 
(2007) but also compiled data from several websites ourselves. 
Table 4: Overview of Variables in the Database* 
Independent Variables  
(Party Bans) 
Intervening and Context  
Variable Clusters 
Dependent Variables 
Implemented particularistic  
party ban (years) 
Countries with IPPBs 
(Countries with legal  
possibility of PPBs) 
Ethnic and religious context 
(Other) ‘risk factors’ 
(Other) conflict specific variables
Political institutions variables 
Conflict level and change  
(major conflict) 
Conflict level and change  
(minor conflict) 
Democracy level and change 
(Freedom House) 
* For a more detailed description of data and sources see Annex I. 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
3.2 Analysis 
According to our hypotheses developed in Chapter 2, particularistic party bans may have 
positive, negative, neutral or context-dependent effects on both conflict and democracy. In 
order to undertake a preliminary test of these hypotheses, we will embark on a two-step 
analysis of possible effects as outlined above in the empirical strategy. First, we will look at 
the sample of particularistic party bans, and second, we will use differences between ‘ban 
countries’ and ‘non-ban countries’ to determine whether we can detect theoretically plausi-
ble correlations with the dynamics of peace and democratization. Although contextual hy-
potheses are controlled for in some respects, we do not engage in a systematic test of their 
interaction with peace and conflict on the one hand and party bans on the other hand. 
3.2.1 Sample I: Ban Cases Only 
If particularistic party bans are a successful way to address conflict, we must expect that the 
level of conflict decreases after the implementation of a party ban. In turn, increased or un-
changed levels of conflict support the hypotheses that bans have an adverse or no impact. As 
for our variables ‘start’ or ‘end’ of a major or minor conflict, the results point to rather neutral 
effects. Regardless of the level of conflict in terms of thresholds, the implementation of party 
bans is mostly related to ‘no change’.9 Out of 22 cases, 19 remained unchanged one year after 
the implementation of a party ban. A similar result is returned when we look at the intensi-
ties of conflict (as shown in Tables 5 and 6) – in this case only data for major conflict (i.e., 
above the 25-battle-death threshold) was available. Out of 21 cases (Namibia had to be coded 
as a missing case), 17 cases showed no change one year after party ban implementation. 
                                                     
9  Due to space constraints, results are not reported in tables. 
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Table 5: Delta Conflict Intensity and Legal Form of Sanction* 
Legal Form of Sanction  Delta Conflict  
Intensity 
Ban Denial of Registration Suspension  
More Conflict Uganda (1993) - Burundi (1997) 2 
No Change CAR (1995) 
Mauritania (2002)
Burundi (1992) 
Equatorial Guinea (1994)
Kenya (1992) 
Mauritania (1991) 
Mauritania (2000) 
Mauritania (2002) 
Mauritania (2004) 
Nigeria (1996) 
Nigeria (1998) 
Nigeria (2002) 
Rwanda (2001) 
Tanzania (1992) 
Tanzania (2005) 
Zambia (1993) 
CAR (1998) 17 
Less Conflict Rwanda (1994) 
Rwanda (2003) 
- - 2 
 5 14 2 21 
* Namibia (2006) not included. 
Source: Authors’ compilation, based on project and UCDP data. 
Table 6: Change of Conflict Intensity and Reason for Ban* 
Official Reason for Ban  Delta Conflict  
Intensity 
Ethnicity Religion Race Region/ 
Secessionism  
 
More Conflict Burundi (1997) Uganda (1993) - - 2 
No Change Burundi (1992) 
CAR (1998) 
Equatorial Guinea (1994)
Mauritania (2002) 
Randa (2003) 
CAR (1995) 
Kenya (1992) 
Mauritania (1991)
Mauritania (2000)
Mauritania (2004)
Zambia (1993) 
Mauritania (2002) Nigeria (1996) 
Nigeria (1998) 
Nigeria (2002) 
Tanzania (1992)
Tanzania (2005)
17
Less Conflict Rwanda (1994) 
Rwanda (2003) 
- - - 2 
 8 7 1 5 21
* Namibia (2006) not included. 
Source: Authors’ compilation, based on project and UCDP data. 
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Although there is apparently a general trend towards neutral or no impact on the aggregate, 
exceptions point to the fact that in individual cases there might have been negative or posi-
tive effects: In three cases major conflicts began after party ban implementation (in Burundi 
in 1993 and in Mauritania in 2003, counted twice).10 With regard to intensities (in terms of 
UCDP coding), we could also detect positive dynamics. Whereas in Burundi (1997) and 
Uganda (1993) conflict levels increased, the implementation of party bans in two Rwandan 
cases (1994 and 2003) was followed by eased conflict.11 
This is not to say that we conclude that party bans are indeed the major cause of the respec-
tive dynamics in these individual cases. Yet, it is also not likely that – in the whole setting of 
surrounding conditions – party bans did not play any role at all. 
Looking at the specific types of party ban – if we want to conceptualize this as a context 
condition – does not point to spectacular relationships. With regard to the legal form of action, 
however, Table 5 illustrates that a denied registration (14 cases) is exclusively connected to 
no change in conflict intensities, whereas an outright ban (dissolution order) has more am-
biguous ‘effects’. Out of five cases, two show no change, another two positive dynamics, and 
one case negative dynamics. Suspension (two cases) is associated with either no change or 
more conflict. A similarly complex picture is derived from the analysis of the official reasons 
of bans (Table 6). Exclusively neutral are apparently bans on the grounds of ‘race’ and ‘re-
gion’ (or secessionism). This holds true roughly for ‘religion’, with just one case connected to 
more intense conflict after ban implementation and six cases which correspond to un-
changed intensities. Ethnicity shows more divergent effects, with Burundi and Rwanda as 
opposed cases vis-à-vis conflict. 
The absolute level of conflict before the implementation of the ban does not produce con-
vincing results either. There might be a slight tendency that when there is no conflict any 
change is rather unlikely (just one change out of 16 cases). With already existing conflict 
(five cases), changes are likelier but point in different directions (two negative, two positive, 
one no change).12 Although it is risky to draw conclusions at this point, one could argue that 
existing conflicts are more sensitive to the impact of party bans. 
Similar to what we found for conflict, there is little evidence that points to a simple connection 
between the implementation of particularistic party bans and democratization. If we look at 
the changes of Freedom House values (average rating of ‘political rights’ and ‘civil liberties’) 
before and after bans, no clear-cut patterns emerge. However, implementation is less fre-
quently associated with ‘no change’ than with conflict. Out of 22 cases, only five party bans 
are connected to stable ratings while six cases show negative and 11 show positive dynamics 
(see Table 7). This could be interpreted as evidence that democracy is more sensitive to the ef-
                                                     
10  The second conflict variable - including minor conflicts - only shows a conflict start in Mauritania because 
Burundi is counted as being a conflict case since 1991. 
11  Uganda must be seen as a special case, however, since party activity was not allowed under the Movement 
System of Museveni. 
12  Due to space constraints, results are not reported in tables. 
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fects of party bans. Given that 50% of the cases display improvements, we may also conclude 
that particularistic party bans are – at least in the short run – more likely to foster democratiza-
tion than to hinder it. However, this may also be due to methodology in the narrow sense, be-
cause changes are more likely for Freedom House ratings, with its 1-7 scale, than the conflict 
scales, which run from 0 to 2 at best. In fact, changes are very small: Only in the cases of Nige-
ria (1998), Rwanda (1994), and Zambia (1993) does the change in the ratings exceed 0,5. 
Table 7: Change of Level of Democracy and Reason for Ban 
Direction Delta  
Freedom House 
Official Reason for Ban  
 Ethnicity  Religion  Race  Region/ 
Secessionism  
 
Negative Burundi (1992) 
Mauritania (2002) 
Rwanda (1994) 
CAR (1995) 
Zambia (1993) 
Mauritania (2002) - 6 
No Change Equatorial Guinea (1994) Mauritania (1991) - Namibia (2006) 
Tanzania (1992) 
Tanzania (2005) 
5 
Positive Burundi (1997) 
CAR (1998) 
Rwanda (2001) 
Rwanda (2003) 
Kenya (1992) 
Mauritania (2000)
Mauritania (2004)
Uganda (1993) 
- Nigeria (1996) 
Nigeria (1998) 
Nigeria (2002) 
11
 8 7 1 6 22
Source: Authors’ compilation, based on project and Freedom House data. 
Cautiously, we can conclude at this stage that we have several types of connections and that 
an impact, if there is one, depends on the context. If this is the case, the crucial context condi-
tion does not seem to be the type of ban in terms of official reason or legal sanction.13 All 
cases are almost evenly distributed with regard to the dynamics of democratization on the 
one hand and the official reason or the legal action on the other. 
When the base level of democracy (before the implementation of a ban) – ‘free’, ‘partly free’ 
or ‘not free’ – is examined, somewhat more interesting results are returned: The first finding 
shows that when a ban is implemented positive dynamics in terms of democracy are appar-
ently more likely in ‘not free’ settings. Out of 14 ‘not free’ cases, nine show positive and only 
two negative dynamics while in ‘free’ and ‘partly free’ regimes the outcomes are fairly 
evenly distributed. We should not overrate this finding, however. For non-free countries, the 
worst category in Freedom House, it may be easier to improve than for others. Yet, another 
result seems remarkable: Although this points rather to the causes of party bans – which is 
not the focus of this paper – only two out of 22 party bans were implemented in ‘free’ or 
democratic countries. Apparently, party bans are particularly popular in non-democratic 
settings (see Figure 1). 
                                                     
13  Due to length constraints, detailed results are not reported. 
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Figure 1: Levels of Democracy before Party Ban Implementation 
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Source: Authors’ compilation, based on project and Freedom House data (FH 1 year before implementation). 
3.2.2 Sample II: Ban Countries vs. Non-ban Countries 
Thus far we have detected little evidence of a simple connection between party bans and 
conflict (as well as democracy). Does comparing ‘ban countries’ and ‘non-ban countries’ 
produce different results? For this purpose we introduced four conflict dummy variables – 
major conflicts only (Conflict I), conflict also including minor conflicts (Conflict II), termina-
tion of Conflict I, and termination of Conflict II – and tested them against the dichotomized 
dependent variable (country with any kind of particularistic party ban/or not). Bivariate cor-
relation coefficients were calculated according to the scale level. In order to capture the pos-
sible impact of surrounding conditions, we also included the variables of the four clusters of 
intervening variables or context conditions. 
At first sight, the somewhat disappointing results of the previous analysis are confirmed. 
None of the conflict variables is significantly connected with the independent variable. It 
apparently does not make a difference for conflict whether any particularistic party ban is 
applied or not (for detailed results see Annex II). The implementation of a party ban (regard-
less of legal form or reason for implementation) did not lead to the termination of an exist-
ing major conflict (see Figure 2). If we include minor conflicts, we see that in one country a 
conflict may have been ended.14 
                                                     
14 The country concerned is Mauritania which is not counted as a conflict case if only major conflicts are in-
cluded. 
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Figure 2: Implemented Party Bans and Terminations of Major Conflicts (Conflict I) 
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Source: Authors’ compilation, based on project and Freedom House data. 
However, we find strong evidence that the prevalence of (violent) conflict and its continua-
tion depends significantly on surrounding conditions. In particular, classical risk factors 
such as human development and income level in 1990, as well as major prior conflicts, are 
systematically connected to (ongoing) Conflict I (major conflicts only) and Conflict II (also 
including minor conflicts), with the signs pointing in the theoretically expected direction. 
Lower levels of development and higher levels of prior conflict render conflict more likely. 
Measures for the ‘particularistic landscape’ apparently affect major conflicts only. In addition 
to prior intrastate conflict (including latent conflicts), a larger Muslim population, a higher 
degree of ethnic or cultural fractionalization (according to Alesina et al. 2003 and Fearon 
2003), and the number of communal contenders – according to the Minorities at Risk (MAR) 
project – seem to have an impact on (ongoing) major conflict. Only the variables regarding 
the existence of a minority problem and the number of groups at risk (both according to 
MAR) show – somewhat weaker – significant relationships with both forms of conflict. 
Variables regarding the political system produce fewer, but still some, significant correla-
tions. There is some evidence that higher levels of behavioural – not ideological – polariza-
tion (that is, confrontation) in the party system are linked to conflict and its continuation. 
This is also true for the number of legislative multiparty elections (1990 to 2007). This may 
be a proxy for stability or levels of democratization, and we also find some support for the 
assumption that more advanced democratization – here conceptualized as an intervening 
variable – renders peace and conflict resolution or termination more probable. 
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Does this mean that party bans can be neglected in terms of the causation of conflict because 
surrounding conditions are much more important? Although we could not yet systemati-
cally test the interaction between all context conditions, conflict, and party bans, one finding 
points to the importance of party bans in terms of conflict. The legal possibility of a particu-
laristic party ban is positively related to the prevalence of major and ongoing conflict (0,321, 
significant at the 5% level). It would be premature, however, to conclude that such provi-
sions contribute to the emergence of violence; major conflict after 1990 is significantly corre-
lated to prior conflict (at the 5% level), and thus the introduction of such a legal provision 
can be interpreted as a reaction to past problems. 
With regard to the level of democracy, bivariate statistics and macro-qualitative comparison 
return no systematic connection to the application of a particularistic party ban. The levels of 
democracy in 1990 and 2006 measured by Freedom House (averages of political rights and 
civil liberties) show no significant relationships (see Annex II). The same is true if we distin-
guish between different types of implemented legal sanctions. Possibly, there is more evi-
dence of positive effects when we look at the dynamics of democratization between 1990 
and 2006. As illustrated by Table 8, the implementation of party bans is exclusively con-
nected to positive developments. Yet, one should not overrate this finding: There are many 
countries without a party ban that show the same positive dynamics. And we should keep 
in mind that we could find negative dynamics in six cases when looking at periods directly 
related to the implementation and not the long period of 1990 to 2006, which partly coin-
cided with the political opening up of sub-Saharan Africa. As well, the countries that im-
plemented party bans were all rated ‘not free’ in 1990, except Namibia (‘free’) and Nigeria 
(‘partly free’). Thus, the possibility of showing a negative dynamic was fairly small in com-
parison to the non-ban countries which showed higher levels of democracy in 1990. 
Table 8: Dynamics of Democratization and Implementation of Party Ban 
Direction Delta  
Freedom House  
1990-2006 
Any Particularistic Party Ban?  
 No Yes  
Negative Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Gambia  3 
No Change Cameroon, Guinea, Somalia, Sudan   4 
Positive Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape 
Verde, Chad, Congo DR, Congo Rep., 
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea-
Bissao, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, 
Sao Tomé, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra 
Leone, Togo 
Burundi, Central African Republic, 
Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Mauritania, 
Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Zambia 
34
 30 11 41
Source: Authors’ compilation based on project and Freedom House data. 
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While there is apparently no strong nexus between party bans and democracy, surrounding 
conditions largely return the expected results: Democracy is less likely when there are longer 
conflicts and when these conflicts have not yet been terminated. However, the simple preva-
lence of major and minor conflict after 1990 is not connected to the level of democracy in 2006. 
The classical risk factors for conflict also show significant relationships with democracy. The 
absence of prior conflict and higher human development levels in 1990, as well as higher 
growth rates before 1990, are significantly associated with higher levels of democracy. 
Interestingly, none of the variables for the particularistic landscape show significant results. 
Contrary to their effects on conflict, many political system variables affect the levels of democ-
ratization. In particular, less-dominant party systems and low levels of confrontation in the 
party system – polarization in the behavioural sense –are strongly and significantly linked to 
the success of democracy in 2006. In fact, polarization of the party system produces the strong-
est results of all variables (average polarization 1990-2001: 0,684 significant at the 1% level). 
Another finding refers to the possibility of a party ban. It has already proven significant for 
the relationship with conflict. Though only significant at the 10% level, if party bans are le-
gally possible, it is also likely that the country is less democratic in 2006. 
Although we have not systematically tested the interaction of context conditions with de-
mocracy (or conflict), it should be mentioned that we indeed find that the prevalence of an 
implemented party ban is not independent from other context conditions. However, such 
variables can be seen as possible causes: We observe that party bans are typically imple-
mented in countries which have presidential systems, were less democratic before 1990, and 
have a specific particularistic landscape. The variable ‘any ban implemented’ is positively 
and significantly linked to more Christians and less ‘Animists’ (i.e., adherents to African 
traditional religions) as well as a larger numbers of indigenous groups, communal contend-
ers, and groups at risk. Remarkably, the degree of numerical ethnic polarization –that is the 
presence of relatively few groups – is negatively associated with the implementation of a 
party ban. Contrary to what would be expected, less-polarized countries are apparently 
more likely to ban particularistic parties. 
3.2.3 Summary of Results 
The results of our preliminary analysis can be summed up as follows: First, there is appar-
ently no clear-cut and simple connection between the implementation of party bans on the 
one hand and conflict and democracy on the other. The hypotheses of strong positive and 
negative effects are not supported. Both the analysis of the bans and the comparison of ban 
and non-ban countries have not returned any significant relationship, possibly save the legal 
possibility of a party ban, which was not our independent variable. The only finding point-
ing to positive impacts may be that none of the countries which implemented a ban after 
1990 showed worse Freedom House values in 2006 as compared to 1990. 
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Second, we find that conflict can be better explained by classical risk factors and variables 
describing the cultural constellation as well as some political system variables. Political sys-
tem variables, particularly regarding the party system, and risk factors are strongly related 
to democracy. 
Third, the strongest results as regards links to implemented party bans are produced when 
we look at variables which are possible causes of the implementation of party bans. Al-
though it is not the purpose of this paper to look at the causes of party bans – implemented 
or not – a by-product of our analysis was the finding that the implementation of party bans 
is systematically connected to, among other things, presidentialism and features of the par-
ticularistic landscape. 
Fourth, although surrounding or context conditions appear to be superior in explaining the 
prevalence of particularistic party bans – which supports hypotheses claiming that party 
bans have no impact – it would be premature to conclude that party bans have no effects at 
all. This is not because of methodological reasons – additional indicators for context condi-
tions and methods allowing to control for more complex causalities have to be applied in the 
future – but also because of the findings from Sample I. In particular, party bans are associ-
ated with ups and downs in levels of democracy, and we have at least anecdotal evidence 
that in countries such as Rwanda (cf. Reyntjens 2004) and Nigeria (Bogaards 2007) party 
bans may be part of a larger process of politics which is certainly relevant for democracy 
and conflict. Determining exactly which cases show positive or negative dynamics deserves 
a more in-depth investigation. 
4 Conclusion 
Since the sweeping (re) introduction of multiparty systems at the beginning of the 1990s, 
almost all sub-Saharan countries have introduced bans on ethnic or – in more general terms 
– particularistic parties. Particularistic party bans target different social identities such as 
ethnicity, religion, race and regional provenance. Other relevant characteristics of such party 
bans include the legal form of the action (bans/dissolution, denied registration, and suspen-
sion) and the question of whether the ban is just a possibility or actually implemented. Party 
bans in Africa have been largely neglected as an area of research, and this paper has en-
gaged in a preliminary analysis of their effects on democracy and peace. Theoretically, par-
ticularistic party bans have the potential to block particularisms from entering politics, but 
they also run the risk of forcing groups to resort to extra-legal means. Given important sur-
rounding conditions, neutral and/or context-dependent effects on democracy and conflict 
are also possible. Respective hypotheses were preliminarily tested by drawing on both a da-
tabase including a unique inventory on party bans and readily available data regarding con-
flict, democracy, and context conditions. 
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Applying macro-qualitative comparison and bivariate statistics, we have found that there is 
no simple connection between the implementation of party bans on the one hand and de-
mocracy and conflict on the other hand. Rather, context conditions seem of superior ex-
planatory power. We have also found a systematic connection between party bans and vari-
ables that could be conceptualized as causes of their implementation. 
Although the results have admittedly been somewhat disappointing thus far, it would be 
premature to conclude that the study of the effects of party bans is superfluous. We could 
detect at least some evidence that points to the context-dependent impact of such bans in in-
dividual cases. Given the preliminary stage of research, many questions remain unan-
swered. For instance, it seems possible that it is not the actual prohibition of a particular par-
ticularistic party that has strong effects but rather the legal possibility: If all relevant actors 
observe the provision, a pre-emptive – and invisible – impact may emerge without any party 
ban being necessary. Regarding implemented bans, the interaction of party bans with con-
text conditions is probably the most promising area of future research in theoretical terms. 
Thus, the main conclusion to be drawn refers to methodological challenges. First, future 
analyses have to take into account invisible pre-emptive effects arising from the mere legal 
possibility of party bans and find ways to measure them, for instance, by comparing coun-
tries with and without these possibilities. Second, the database should be extended both in 
terms of additional and modified indicators. For instance, a more advanced typology of par-
ticularistic party bans including characteristics such as ‘positive’ vs. ‘negative‘ measures and 
the general degree of ‘restrictiveness’ may help in finding more convincing relationships. 
Moreover, other measures of party regulation and specific measures to accommodate inter-
communal relations, particularly specific features of electoral systems, should be integrated. 
The application of different indicators of conflict and democracy is also recommended (e.g., 
various additional periods of time, other democracy measures, and the exact nature and in-
tensity of inter-communal conflict). 
Third, additional and more sophisticated macro-qualitative and macro-quantitative methods 
such as QCA or ‘fuzzy sets’ or multivariate regressions can be applied as soon as the data-
base allows for it. Finally, we should not confine ourselves to methods aiming at generaliza-
tion. Small-N and in-depth case studies – which may also look at changes over time – will 
probably be the most promising tool to control complex sets of conditions and to understand 
and explain what impact particularistic party bans may have in individual cases. 
In any case, we should know more about the actual effects of a measure of party regulation 
whose normative compatibility with democracy remains uncertain. 
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Annex I: List of Variables 
Table I.1: Party Ban Variables 
Variable Response Options/Scale Source* 
Any implemented particularistic party ban (IPPB)? 1 Yes 
0 No 
EPB 
Type of legal sanction 1 Ban 
2 Denial of registration 
3 Suspension 
EPB 
Ban/dissolution of a particularistic party? 1 Yes 
0 No 
EPB 
Official reason 1 Ethnicity 
2 Religion 
3 Race 
4 Regionalism/ 
Secessionism 
EPB 
Denial of registration of a particularistic party? 1 Yes 
0 No 
EPB 
Official reason 1 Ethnicity 
2 Religion 
3 Race 
4 Regionalism/ 
Secessionism 
EPB 
Suspension of a particularistic party? 1 Yes 
0 No 
EPB 
Official reason 1 Ethnicity 
2 Religion 
3 Race 
4 Regionalism/ 
Secessionism 
EPB 
Particularistic party ban possible? 1 Yes 
0 No 
EPB 
* EPB = Ethnic Party Bans in Africa Project. 
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Table I.2: Conflict Variables 
Variable Response  
Options/Scale 
Source* Remarks 
Time span I In years AKUF, UCDP Only major conflicts  
(≥ 25 battle deaths) 
Time span II In years AKUF, HIIK, UCDP Including latent conflicts 
Conflict after 1990 I 1 Yes 
0 No 
AKUF, UCDP Only major conflicts  
(≥ 25 battle deaths) 
Conflict after 1990 II 1 Yes 
0 No 
AKUF, HIIK, UCDP Including latent conflicts 
Delta Conflict after  
1990 I 
-1 Start of conflict
0 No change 
1 End of conflict 
AKUF, UCDP 1 year before and 1 year  
after implementation 
Delta Conflict after  
1990 II 
-1 Start of conflict
0 No change 
1 End of conflict 
AKUF, HIIK, UCDP 1 year before and 1 year  
after implementation 
Conflict type 1 Anti-regime 
2 Autonomy 
3 Others 
4 Mixed 
0 No conflict 
AKUF Domestic conflicts only 
Conflict termination I 1 Yes 
0 No 
AKUF, UCDP As of end of 2006,  
only major conflicts 
Conflict termination II 1 Yes 
0 No 
AKUF, HIIK, UCDP As of end of 2006,  
including latent conflicts 
Conflict 1 year before  
implementation 
0 No conflict 
1 Minor conflict 
2 War 
UCDP  
Conflict year of  
implementation 
0 No conflict 
1 Minor conflict 
2 War 
UCDP  
Conflict 1 year after  
implementation 
0 No conflict 
1 Minor conflict 
2 War 
UCDP  
Delta Conflict 1 year  
before and 1 year after  
implementation 
(-2)-(2) UCDP  
* AKUF = Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung, 
  UCDP = Uppsala Conflict Data Programme, 
  HIIK = Heidelberger Institut für Internationale Konfliktforschung. 
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Table I.3: Democracy Variables 
Variable Response  
Options/Scale
Source 
Average Political Rights –  
Civil Liberties 1990 
1-7 Freedom House 
Freedom House 1990 1 Free 
2 Partly Free 
3 Not free 
Freedom House 
Average Political Rights –  
Civil Liberties 2006 
1-7 Freedom House 
Freedom House 2006 1 Free 
2 Partly Free 
3 Not free 
Freedom House 
Delta Average Political Rights –  
Civil Liberties 1990-2006 
(-6)-6 Freedom House 
Average Political Rights –  
Civil Liberties 1980 
1-7 Freedom House 
Average Political Rights –  
Civil Liberties 1989 
1-7 Freedom House 
Average Political Rights –  
Civil Liberties 1 year before  
implementation 
1-7 Freedom House 
Freedom House 1 year before  
implementation 
1 Free 
2 Partly free 
3 Not free 
Freedom House 
Average Political Rights –  
Civil Liberties 1 year after  
implementation 
1-7 Freedom House 
Average Political Rights –  
Civil Liberties 1 year before and  
1 year after denial of registration: PP
(-6)-6 Freedom House 
Direction Delta Freedom House -1 Negative 
0 No change 
1 Positive 
Freedom House 
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Table I.4: (Other) Factors Relevant for Conflict and Democracy (Risk Factors and Par-
ticularistic Landscape) 
Variable Response  
Options/Scale 
Source* Remarks 
Income level Income p.c. 1990 
(in Atlas Dollar) 
African Development 
Indicators 1992 
 
Growth before 1990 1986-1990 (in %) African Development 
Indicators 1992 
 
Human Development 1990 HDI 1990 HDR/UNDP 1992  
Dependency on primary  
commodities 
Exports to GDP % Commodity Yearbook 
2003/Vol. I 
 
Prior conflicts I 0- UCDP Cumulated conflict intensity, 
including interstate and  
independence wars 
Prior conflicts II 1 Yes 
0 No 
AKUF, HIIK, UCDP Only intrastate conflicts,  
including  
latent conflicts 
Regime stability before 1990 In years  
before 1990 
http://africanelections.
tripod.com/ 
 
Christians %/population 0-100 WCD (2007)  
Muslims %/population 0-100 WCD (2007)  
African traditional religion  
%/population 
0-100 WCD (2007)  
Polarity I 1-3 GIGA Unless one group over two  
thirds (1), number of groups 
over 25% 
Religious fractionalization 0,00-1,00 Alesina et al. 2003 Constructed according to  
Alesina et al. 2003 
Polarization Index I  
(three religious families) 
0,00-1,00 GIGA Constructed according to  
Montalvo/Reynal-Querol  
(2005) 
Ethnic fractionalization Alesina 0,00-1,00 Alesina et al. 2003  
Ethnic fractionalisation Fearon 0,00-1,00 Fearon 2003  
Cultural fractionalization Fearon 0,00-1,00 Fearon 2003  
Ethnic fractionalization PREG 0,00-1,00 Posner 2004  
Ethnic fractionalization ELF 0,00-1,00 Posner 2004  
Ethnic polarization  0,00-1,00 Montalvo/ 
Reynal-Querol 2005 
 
Minority problem? 1 Yes 
0 No  
Minorities at Risk Existence of groups at risk  
or not 
Number of Ethno-national Groups 0-  Minorities at Risk  
Number of Indigenous Groups 0- Minorities at Risk  
Number of Ethno-class Groups 0- Minorities at Risk  
Number of Communal contenders 0- Minorities at Risk  
Number of Religious sects 0- Minorities at Risk  
Number National minorities 0- Minorities at Risk  
Number of Groups at Risk 0- Minorities at Risk Sum of groups of all types 
* AKUF = Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung, 
  UCDP = Uppsala Conflict Data Programme, 
  HDR = Human Development Report, 
  HIIK = Heidelberger Institut für Internationale Konfliktforschung, 
  UNDP = United Nations Development Programme, 
  WCD = World Christian Database. 
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Definitions: 
Types of Groups at Risk According to Minority at Risk Project 
Ethno-national: These are regionally concentrated peoples with a history of organized politi-
cal autonomy and their own state, traditional ruler, or regional government, who have sup-
ported political movements for autonomy at some time since 1945. 
Indigenous: These are conquered descendants of earlier inhabitants of a region who live 
mainly in conformity with traditional social, economic, and cultural customs that are 
sharply distinct from those of dominant groups. 
Ethno-class: These are ethnically or culturally distinct peoples, usually descended from 
slaves or immigrants, most of whom occupy a distinct social and economic stratum or niche. 
Communal Contenders: These are culturally distinct peoples, tribes, or clans in heterogenous 
societies who hold or seek a share in state power. Disadvantaged communal contenders are 
subject to some degree of political, economic, or cultural discrimination but lack offsetting 
advantages. Advantaged communal contenders are those with political advantages over 
other groups in their society. Dominant communal contenders are those with a preponder-
ance of both political and economic power. 
Religious Sects: These are communal groups that differ from others principally in their reli-
gious beliefs and related cultural practices, and whose political status and activities are cen-
tred on the defence of their beliefs. 
National Minorities: These are segments of a trans-state people with a history of organized 
political autonomy whose kindred control an adjacent state but who now constitute a minor-
ity in the state in which they reside. 
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Table I.5: Political System Variables 
Variable Response Options/Scale Source* Remarks 
Disproportionality of electoral  
system (theoretical) I 
1 Plurality in multi-member  
constituencies 
2 Plurality in single-member  
constituencies 
3 Absolute majority in single/
multi-member constituencies 
4 Segmented systems/mixed- 
member proportional systems
5 Proportional representation 
in small constituencies 
6 Proportional representation 
in medium and large  
constituencies 
7 Pure proportional  
representation 
Erdmann/Basedau 2007, 
Hartmann 2007 
Date of first election 
Disproportionality of electoral  
system (theoretical) II 
Cf. Erdmann/Basedau 2007, 
Hartmann 2007 
Date of last election 
Year of change Year Erdmann/Basedau 2007, 
Hartmann 2007 
 
Party system type I 1 Dominant 
2 Near-dominant 
3 Two-party 
4 Moderate pluralism 
5 Extreme pluralism 
Erdmann/Basedau 2007, 
Hartmann 2007 
As at year of first election, 
relevant parties according 
to Sartori 
Party system type I rec. 1 Dominant/near-dominant 
2 Two-party 
3 Moderate/extreme pluralism
Erdmann/Basedau 2007, 
Hartmann 2007 
As at year of first election, 
relevant parties according 
to Sartori 
Party system type II Cf. Erdmann/Basedau 2007, 
Hartmann 2007 
As at year of first election, 
relevant parties according 
to Sartori 
Party system type II rec. Cf. Erdmann/Basedau 2007, 
Hartmann 2007 
As at year of first election, 
relevant parties according 
to Sartori 
Total N of MP legislative  
elections 1990-2007 
0- Erdmann/Basedau 2007 Lower Chamber 
Number of regime changes 0- EPB Extra-constitutional  
government change 
Seat share winner first  
multiparty election 1990ff 
In % Erdmann/Basedau 2007, 
African Elections  
Database 
 
Seat share winner last  
multiparty election 
In % Erdmann/Basedau 2007  
Polarization (behavioural) first  
election 1990ff 
0-6 EPB on the basis of  
Lindberg 2004 
 
Polarization (behavioural) last  
election (before 2002) 
0-6 EPB on the basis of  
Lindberg 2004 
 
Average polarization score  
(TPS) per election (1990-2001) 
0-6 EPB on the basis of  
Lindberg 2004 
 
Presidentialism score 1 Parliamentarism 
2 Semi-presidentialism 
3 Presidentialism 
Basedau 2005, EPB  
* EPB = Ethnic Party Bans in Africa Project. 
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Definitions: 
Type of Party System 
Dominant: One party wins absolute majority in all elections. 
Near-dominant: One party wins absolute majority in all elections but one (relative majority) 
Two-party: two parties alternate in gaining absolute majorities. 
Moderate pluralism: Two to four parties needed to gain absolute majorities OR no clear-cut 
pattern that predominantly resembles moderate pluralism. 
Extreme pluralism: At least five parties needed to gain absolute majorities OR no clear-cut 
pattern that predominantly resembles extreme pluralism. 
Polarization (Behavourial Level between Cooperation and Confrontation) 
Sum of scores to three questions: 
1) Did the opposition participate? Yes, all (0) 
      Some parties (1) 
      No (2) 
2) Did the losers accept the results? Yes, immediately (0) 
      Only some or initially not (1) 
      No, not at all (2) 
3) Was the election peaceful? Yes (0) 
      Isolated violent incidents (1) 
      No, not at all (2) 
Presidentialism Score 
Parliamentarism: Chief executive is elected by parliament and can by dismissed by no-
confidence vote; no directly elected president OR if yes, no executive powers. 
Semi-presidentialism: Directly elected chief executive and prime minister depends partly on 
parliament; chief executive cannot independently appoint AND dismiss prime minister. 
Presidentialism: Directly elected chief executive, no prime minister OR directly elected chief 
executive can independently dismiss and appoint prime minister. 
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Annex II: Bivariate Statistics 
Table II.1: Biravariate Statistics for ’Any Implemented Particularistic Party Ban’ and 
Conflict Variables 
Independent Variables Any  
IPPD? 
Conflict  
after 1990  
I 
Conflict  
after 1990  
II 
Conflict  
Termination  
I 
Conflict  
Termination 
II 
Party ban variables       
Particularistic party ban implemented -     
Registration refused to particularistic  
party 
-     
Suspension of particularistic party -     
particularistic party ban possible - 0,321**  -0,328**  
Any IPPB? -     
Conflict variables      
Time span I  - - - - 
Time span II  - - - - 
Conflict after 1990 I  - - - - 
Conflict after 1990 II  - - - - 
Type of conflict  - - - - 
Conflict termination I   - - - - 
Conflict termination II  - - - - 
Democracy      
Average Political Rights (PR) and Civil  
Liberties (CL) (1990) 
 0,317**  -0,380***  
Average PR-CL (2006)    -0,303** -0,361** 
Average PR-CL (1980)      
Average PR-CL (1989)  0,312**  -0,363**  
Other risk factors      
Income level  -0,270* -0,397*** 0,276* 0,402*** 
Growth before 1990      
Human Development 1990  -0,426*** -0,280* 0,425*** 0,282* 
Dependency on primary commodities      
Prior conflicts  0,365** 0,271* -0,406*** -0,254* 
Prior conflicts II  0,259*  -0,271*  
Regime stability before 1990   -0,315**  0,328** 
Christians %/population 0,315** -0,252*    
Muslims %/population  0,255*  -0,243*  
African traditional religion %/population -0,282*     
Polarity I (1-3)       
Religious fractionalization       
Polarization index       
Becher/Basedau: Promoting Peace and Democracy through Party Regulation? 35 
Independent Variables Any  
IPPD? 
Conflict  
after 1990  
I 
Conflict  
after 1990  
II 
Conflict  
Termination  
I 
Conflict  
Termination 
II 
Ethnic fractionalization Alesina   0,396***  -0,392***  
Ethnic fractionalization Fearon      
Cultural fractionalization Fearon  -0,274*  0,273*  
Ethnic fractionalization PREG      
Ethnic fractionalization ELF      
Ethnic polarization ETHPOL -0,295*     
Minority problem  0,363** 0,505*** -0,369** -0,507*** 
Number of Ethno-national Groups     -0,248* 
Number of Indigenous Groups 0,282*     
Number of Ethno-class Groups      
Number of Communal-contenders 0,319* 0,332**  -0,343**  
Number of Religious sects      
Number of National minorities No case No case No case No case No case 
Number of Groups at Risk 0,342** 0,278* 0,281* -0,292* -0,290* 
Political variables       
Disproportionality of electoral system  
(theoretical) I  
 0,247*    
Disproportionality of electoral system  
(theoretical) II 
     
Party system type I      
Party system type I rec      
Party system type II      
Party system type II rec      
Total N of MP legislative elections  
1990-2007 
 -0,297** 0,355** 0,324** 0,396*** 
Number of regime changes      
Seat share winner first multiparty  
election 1990ff 
     
Seat share winner last multiparty  
election  
     
Polarization first election 1990 ff   0,290* -0,281* -0,315** 
Polarization last election (before 2002)      
Average polarization score (TPS) per  
election (1990-2001)  
    -0,265* 
Presidentialism score 0,316**     
Significances: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% (Pearson’s r and Spearman-Rho), (-) not calculated. 
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Table II.2: Bivariate Statistics for Democracy Level and Change 
Independent Variables Any IPPB?1 Arithmetic  
Mean  
PR-CL 2006 
Party ban variables   
Particularistic party ban implemented -  
Registration refused to particularistic party -  
Suspension of particularistic party -  
Particularistic party ban possible - 0,244* 
Any IPPB? -  
Conflict variables   
Time span I  0,296** 
Time span II  0,244* 
Conflict after 1990 I   
Conflict after 1990 II  0,237* 
Type of conflict   
Conflict termination I   -0,303** 
Conflict termination II  -0,361** 
Democracy   
Average PR-CL (1990)  0,512*** 
Average PR-CL (2006)   
Delta Average PR-CL (1990-2006)  -0,690*** 
Average PR-CL (1980)  0,263* 
Average PR-CL (1989)  0,424*** 
Delta Average PR-CL (1980-1989) -0,320** 0,090* 
Other risk factors   
Income level   
Growth before 1990  -0,354** 
Human Development 1990  -0,354** 
Dependency on primary commodities   
Prior conflicts  0,345** 
Prior conflicts II  0,339** 
Regime stability before 1990   
Christians %/population 0,315**  
Muslims %/population   
African traditional religion %/population -0,282*  
Polarity I (1-3)    
Religious fractionalization    
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Independent Variables Any IPPB?1 Arithmetic  
Mean  
PR-CL 2006 
Polarization index    
Ethnic fractionalization Alesina    
Ethnic fractionalization Fearon   
Cultural fractionalization Fearon   
Ethnic fractionalization PREG   
Ethnic fractionalization ELF   
Ethnic polarization ETHPOL -0,295*  
Minority problem   
Number of Ethno-national Groups   
Number of Indigenous Groups 0,282*  
Number of Ethno-class Groups   
Number of Communal contenders 0,319*  
Number of Religious sects   
Number of National minorities No case No case 
Number of Groups at Risk  0,342**  
Political variables   
Disproportionality of electoral system (theoretical) I    
Disproportionality of electoral system (theoretical) II   
Party system type I   
Party system type I rec  -0,306** 
Party system type II   
Party system type II rec  -0,264* 
Total N of MP legislative elections 1990-2007  -0,595*** 
Number of regime changes   
Seat share winner first multiparty election 1990ff   
Seat share winner last multiparty election    
Polarization first election 1990 ff  0,643*** 
Polarization last election (before 2002)  0,550*** 
Average polarization score (TPS) per election (1990-2001)  0,684*** 
Presidentialism score 0,316** 0,315** 
1 Reported to facilitate comparison. 
Significances: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% (Pearson’s r and Spearman-Rho), (-) not calculated. 
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